# ROOTS AND ROUTES: THINKING THROUGH RELIGIOUS PATHWAYS OF INCORPORATION AND HOMELAND INVOLVEMENT AMONG THE SECOND GENERATION

**PEGGY LEVITT WELLESLEY COLLEGE AND HARVARD UNIVERSITY**

**DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION**

## INTRODUCTION

Becoming a pharmacist is an "approved" career for Gujarati girls. Bindi, a twenty-three-year-old second generation Indian American told me. She and her friend Sonali were recalling the many Saturday nights they spent growing up together. "It was like you had your school friends," Sonali said, "but the message was clear that your real friends were the Indian families we saw every weekend." Bindi and Sonali live in middle-class towns in the northeastern United States where there are few other Indian residents. While Bindi's mother continued to pack *dal* and *chapattis* in her lunch box, Sonali's mother had given in to her daughter's complaints about classmates' teasing by the time she was in sixth grade. In a way, Bindi and Sonali were relieved to get together on Saturdays and Sundays with kids who looked, ate, and had parents just like you. You didn't have to do any explaining or worry that your friends wouldn't like the smells coming from your lunchbox.

Sonali's mother always had a *mandir,* or small altar, in her home but she never told her kids much about it. When Sonali was in middle school, her family began getting together informally for prayers with other Indian families who lived nearby. There were several girls close to Bindi's age. Once everyone arrived, they would sit on the living room floor and sing *baghans*, or devotional prayers. They spent the rest of the evening eating and socializing, with the parents colonizing the living room and the kids running up and down between the kitchen and the basement playroom.

Growing up, Bindi said, you knew that all the parents were watching you. If another family happened to live in your town, you were always looking over your shoulder to make sure they weren't there if you were with someone inappropriate or going somewhere you weren't supposed to go. "It was like the parents joined forces," Bindi explained. "The uncles and aunties were so worried about us growing up right; they had no problem telling each other's kids what to do." She felt a lot of pressure to have proper manners and be a gracious host or guest because "we were all expected to be perfect Indian children who were constantly being compared to each other." In high school, she remembers being asked all the time what she wanted to do when she grew up. "I had no idea," she said, "but I thought you were supposed to know, so I used to say 'engineer' because that seemed to be a good answer. Everyone is supposed to be a doctor or an engineer. I really didn't even know what an engineer does."

In many ways, kids like Sonalii and Bindi live between a rock and a hard place. Their parents are ambivalent about their assimilation into the United States and they communicate these mixed feelings to their children. They want their kids to fit in but not too much. The line between being "too American" and "too Indian" is never clear. Because they don't belong to a formal religious community, which draws a line in the sand for its members, they have to figure it out for themselves. Kids often feel that if they excel on one standard, they fail with respect to another.

When they leave for college, these same young adults have to figure out who they are outside the context of their families. Their South Asian classmates automatically expect them to join the Asian Students Association. Their roommates ask them questions about Hinduism or Islam they cannot answer. The world makes assumptions about who they are and they feel that they somehow come up short. This propels the Gujarati young man to seek out the Hindu

Student Advisor or the Muslim young woman to experiment with wearing a headscarf. It's a combination of things, Sonali and Bindi explained – finally being interested in learning about your traditions, rather than being forced to by your parents; being thrilled at finding a like-minded community that welcomes you with open arms; and feeling responsible for representing your group to the rest of the world. "It was such a relief," Bindi said, "to talk about your parents and not have to explain anything to anyone in the room because they were all going through the exact same thing. I couldn't believe there were twenty-five other girls who had families just like mine."

People like Dilip, a twenty-five year old, also from Massachusetts, who grew up going to meetings of Swadhyaya, a Hindu religious community, may have an advantage. As children, they have been given a framework, even though they sometimes reject it as adults. Many go to religious summer camps, where they spend a week worshipping, playing, and studying with fellow believers from around the country. "Those summers were so important to me because it was the one time during the year when I was surrounded by kids who were just like me. I would come back feeling like my combination [of being Indian and American] was normal."

Growing up in a place like New Jersey, with a large Indian community, as opposed to a satellite community like Massachusetts, also makes a big difference. Dilip has many cousins living in Elizabeth where the Indian population is over reached over 1,300 in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau). He remembers visiting there as a child and thinking his life was so different from his cousins. They went to school with so many Gujarati[1] kids. Every other store in the downtown was an Indian restaurant or Indian grocery store. That's a far cry from Lynnfield, where you still have to travel three towns over to get *garam masala*.[2] "It's good and bad, you know," he said thoughtfully, "They think being Indian is normal. They don't have to work very hard at it. But

they never have to come outside their bubble.  When we were talking about where she wanted to go to college, my cousin said she only wanted to go to Seton Hall or Rutgers because they are colleges where lots of Indians go.  When will she learn to live outside her ghetto?"

While these kids grapple with being ethnic in America, they are also struggling with how to be a second-generation American in their ancestral home.  This is another test with multiple masters.  Most of the families I spoke with while conducting this study took their children back to their homelands in a regular basis while they were growing up.  Some went back every year, staying for three or four months at a time. These trips were generally remembered in glowing terms, although they presented challenges.  Perhaps the greatest was knowing that everyone was watching you.  Just Sonali and Bindi felt they were given a "well-brought-up-test" every Saturday night,homeland vacations felt like extended report cards for parents and children.

Anika, a thirty-year old second generation Gujarati, lives with her parents in a small town near the New Hampshire border.  Her parents are pillars of the local Swadhyaya community. She continued to attend meetings even after she went to college, coming home on the weekends and teaching classes for the youngest children. Swadhyaya, she said, helped her to have confidence in who she was and doing the right thing even when others were making wrong choices.  If anyone has been well trained about Indian culture, it is Anika.

Four years ago, Anika went back to India with her father.  While it was officially a trip to see her grandparents, everyone knew it was really about meeting a potential mate.  Her father told her to be herself. But she could tell she was being carefully scrutinized.  If she didn't show sufficient respect, if she wasn't sufficiently humble, or if her compliments to the chef were a little too lukewarm, she could sense the disapproval.  She wasn't sure how to make things right. "It

felt like I was in a place where all the things we learn at Swadhyaya were being lived everyday, but that the rules were slightly different. I couldn't quite get it."

Still, when I visited her family two years later, her relatives could not sing her praises loudly enough. She was right in assuming that they were watching her carefully. But they were satisfied by what they saw. They were also willing to give her the benefit of the doubt because they could see she was trying, as her Uncle in Gujarat described,

> My brother visited with his daughter Anika in 1999. We hadn't seen them in more than five years. We were wondering what she would be like. Some kids come back here and it's like they are allergic to India. They don't like the food, the dust, the heat. She was very different. She was very interested in everything. She was very respectful. She didn't wait to be waited on. I told my brother he had done a good job raising her. It is possible to bring up good Indian children in America.

These vignettes shed light on several important aspects of the second generation experience. For one thing, some children of immigrants live their lives in a thick, dense, cross-border field of relationships that encompass people, places, and values from around the world. While children are raised in New York, Boston, or Los Angeles, their lives are often profoundly influenced by forces thousands of miles away. While they may not engage in transnational practices, or only do so periodically, the social and emotional milieu in which they grow up is infused with homeland influences. This multiple embeddedness generates resources and poses challenges for successful educational and occupational outcomes. For another, religion is an important, under-unexplored engine of enduring homeland connections and ties that bind migrants and their descendants to co-religionists around the world, which combine, in multiple ways, with trajectories of host-country incorporation. Believing and belonging generate multiple forms of capital and influence civic engagement in both home and host-country affairs.

There is a large body of work on the experiences of second generation immigrants in the United States and the nature of their social and economic incorporation. Much of this work, however, only superficially engages in a dialogue with transnational migration scholarship.[3] It continues to see immigrant incorporation as a product of forces at work within receiving countries rather than a combination of factors in the source and receiving society, as well as around the world. Because most of the children of immigrants have no plans to return to live in their ancestral homes, and they are not completely fluent in their parents' mother tongue, many scholars conclude that transnational activism among the second generation will be insignificant and that "transnational parents do not necessarily produce transnational children" (Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf and Waters 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

I agree that transnational migration is primarily the purview of the first generation and that the children of immigrants will not engage in their ancestral homes with the same intensity, frequency, and scope as their parents. But the importance of growing up in a transnational social field, and its impact on socialization and social networks, should not be overlooked. Just as membership in tightly-knit ethnic communities socializes children and embeds them in powerful, often protective social networks producing opportunities as well as obligations, so even indirect, almost "by osmosis" membership in the homeland community is also a potential source of power, information, and support. The extent to which the children of immigrants take advantage of these resources depends on the organizational context and changes over the life course.

This paper explores the role of religion in shaping pathways of incorporation and homeland engagement. I base my discussion on selective findings from prior research and on my own work on transnational migration and religion in four immigrant communities living in the Boston Metropolitan area. I interviewed 247 first generation individuals including Muslims from

Pakistan, Hindus from Gujarat state in India, Protestants from the city Governador Valadares in Brazil, and Irish Catholics from the Inishowen peninsula in County Donegal. I also traveled to each sending community where I talked with at least 50 family members and friends in each of the communities migrants came from (Levitt 2007). One of the goals of this study was to understand how migrants and their families use their faith to belong simultaneously to their home and host countries and how this affects their civic engagement. As part of this work, I also talked with a number of second generation respondents, including 28 Irish, 13 Brazilians, 38 Gujaratis, and 10 Pakistanis. What I learned from these conversations is by no means definitive. Some of the points I make are based on the actual experiences of the children of immigrants I spoke with; others reflect my attempt to think through the impact and meaning of growing up in a transnational social field and religion's unique role in shaping that experience. This paper, then, is intended to suggest possible trends and point to future research directions.

**THEORETICAL DEBATES**

Debates about immigrant incorporation in the United States are characterized by a fault line separating "neo-assimilationists" and "segmented assimilationists." Each of these perspectives acknowledges that patterns of assimilation, acculturation and integration vary depending on the country and context of departure, immigrant characteristics, immigrant enclave capacities, and the political, social and economic context of the sending and receiving communities. Neo-assimilationists argue that immigrants will (and should) eventually adopt mainstream (i.e., white Anglo-Protestant) American values and achieve higher social and economic status as they becomes culturally and linguistically similar to the American middle-class. Assimilation, according to Alba and Nee, is "the decline, and at is endpoint, the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express

it" (1997, 863). They acknowledge, however, that any viable conceptualization of assimilation must recognize that ethnicity and race are linked to social and cultural differences that influence its outcomes (Alba and Nee 2003, 11; cf. Jacoby 2004; Kivisto 2005; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). They say that the differences characterizing past and current waves of immigration, and their impact on the integration of the second and subsequent generations, are overblown.

The other side sees increasing evidence of "segmented assimilation," in which second generation Americans are incorporated into the United States through several possible trajectories, including becoming part of the white-mainstream, deliberately preserving the immigrant community's culture and values accompanied by economic incorporation, or becoming part of the underclass, leading to poverty and downward mobility (Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001).[4] They believe that the racial and ethnic barriers to assimilation for new immigrants are higher than and qualitatively distinct from immigrants in the past. According to this perspective, the experience of the first generation, the comparative pace of acculturation among parents and their children, the social and economic barriers confronting the children of immigrants, and family and community resources shape the second generation experience in different ways than before.

Segmented assimilation among the second generation predicts differential outcomes of selective, consonant, and dissonant acculturation depending largely on family background variables including SES status, strategies of incorporation and adaptation to the host country, and difference in parenting behaviors. Selective acculturation, where parents and children agree on ethnic retention, is normally associated with higher family SES, also implies greater interest in the sending society and its culture, traditions, and heritage (Haller and Landolt 2005).

Consonant acculturation occurs when parents and their children simultaneously and actively pursue accelerated assimilation into the mainstream of the host society, while dissonant acculturation presents a generation gap where children of immigrants disdain their parents for clinging to their ethnic ways and actively immerse themselves in the youth cultures and countercultures of the new (see also Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). These scholars predict that selective acculturation leads to the most positive socioeconomic outcomes.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition that migration must be understood as a transnational process. This scholarship urges us to abandon "methodological nationalism" or the assumption that social life is automatically and logically organized into nation-state containers because doing so blinds us to many ways in which the world actually works (Wimmer and Schiller 2003). To recognize these dynamics, one has to trade in a national lens for a transnational one. That is not to deny the continuing importance of nation-states nor the fact that states continue to regulate many aspects of life. Nor it is to argue that everything is produced by factors operating outside national borders. Indeed, in many cases, they play only a small supporting role in the story. It is to say that to understand today's world, one has to ask how individuals and groups actually organize themselves, without assuming, a priori, that they fit neatly within a national box.

A transnational gaze begins with a world that is borderless and boundaryless and then explores what kinds of boundaries exist and why they arise in a particular historical context. It tries hard not to overemphasize the global or the local, but to hold these social layers, along with everything in between, in productive conversation with each other. The world is too broad, deep, and complex to be captured by a lens that focuses only on a single level of social experience. A

transnational perspective tries to look at all levels of social interaction simultaneously and to understand how they mutually inform each other (Khagram and Levitt 2004).

Understanding migration as a transnational process, and that immigrants and their children will simultaneously belong to this country and their homelands for the long haul, reveals several important things. First, migrants and their children organize many aspects of their lives around their country of origin at the same time that they become part of the countries that receive them. They remain in contact with friends and family members and support them socially and economically across borders; they return home to visit; they send or receive economic and social remittances; and they participate in political and civic life. They also engage in transnational collective activities, which create and recreate religious, civic, and political institutions; support major infrastructural and social service improvements; and facilitate political and civic engagement in the home and host-land. In addition, transnational institutions provide newcomers with channels for participation and entrepreneurial pursuits they might otherwise be excluded from.

Their lifestyles challenge the very notion of "generation." Generational experiences are shaped by common experiences during youth that create a shared worldview or frame of reference which influences subsequent social and political activism (Eckstein and Barberia 2002; Mannheim 1951). But, in many cases, socialization and social reproduction occur across borders, in response to at least two social and cultural contexts. Even children who never return to their parent's ancestral homes are brought up in households where people, values, goods and claims from somewhere else are present on a daily basis (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Pries 2004). Similarly, the children of nonmigrants are raised in social networks and settings saturated by people, resources, and social remittances from the host country (Levitt 1998). For these

individuals, the generational experience is not territorially bounded. It is based on actual and imagined experiences that are shared across borders regardless of where someone was born or now lives (Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2002). Conceptualizing generation as a lineal process, involving clear boundaries between one experience and the other, implies a separation between migrants' and nonmigrants' socialization and social networks that might not exist (Eckstein 2004; Eckstein and Barberia 2002). Furthermore, as Waters and Jimenez remind us about the U.S. context, in contrast to prior eras of migration, there is now an ongoing replenishment of new immigrants, "[A]t any point in time each generation is a mix of cohorts and each cohort has a mix of generations" (Waters and Jimenez 2005, 107 & 121). The life experiences of children raised in transnational social fields will be constantly informed by new injections of social and cultural goods imported by each new immigrant influx.

Moreover, those who live in transnational social fields manage (at least) two sets of, often-conflicting ideas about race, gender, and class and competing images of progress and success. They are situated between a variety of different, often competing generational and locational points of reference, including those of their parents and their grandparents as well as their own, real and imagined perspectives. These social positions, and the meanings attributed to them, are constructed transnationally. For example, conceptions of race in Latin America and the United States are very different from each other. While the "one drop" rule marks someone as a person of color in the U.S., in many Latin American countries, social mobility allows individuals to "whiten their skin."[5] Ethnic and gender identity formation also occurs in multiple settings (Gardner and Grillo 2002; Mahler and Pessar 2006; Pluss 2005; Purkayastha 2005; Totoricaguena 2005; Willis 2000). The children of immigrants thus create their own yardsticks

which mix home and host-country factors; where they locate themselves in these status hierarchies reflects their multiple positions.

These dynamics dramatically change the meaning of incorporation. The immigrant experience is not a linear, irreversible journey from one membership to another. Rather, migrants pivot back and forth between sending, receiving and other orientations at different stages of their lives. The more these ties are institutionalized or grounded in legal, health care and pension systems on both sides of the border, the more likely it is that transnational lives will endure and persist beyond the first generation (Caglar 2002). Newcomers will not fully assimilate or remain entirely focused on their homelands but continue to craft some combination of the two (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Morawska 2003). Even when children are raised entirely in the United States, and have very little direct actual experience with their ancestral home, they often are brought up in a social imaginary, or a set of values, institutions, laws, and symbols, consisting of homeland and host-country elements.

Moreover, ethnicity is not the only path migrants traverse to become part of new countries. That so much research, in large part by methodological artifact, privileges ethnicity or nationality as the predominant identity frame shaping incorporation is a clear example of the kind of methodological nationalism Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) and Brubaker (2003) urge us to avoid. Instead, there are several possible modes of incorporation that follow several potential multiple pathways (Glick Schiller, Caglar and Guldbrandsen 2006; Werbner 2000).[6] Migrants connect to sending and receiving-country institutions at multiple points, including religious, gender, and political affiliations. Thus, a transnational lens drives home the point that factors in the home and host country, as well as other important sites around the world, shape the

life trajectories of the second generation. It also emphasizes the multiple pathways through which immigrants and their children become connected to and engage with institutions.

Finally, a transnational optic underscores the importance of place. The urban landscape, or the increasingly suburban and rural one, that is the backdrop of settlement, powerfully influences "simultaneity," or the state of belonging, to several communities at once. Whether a particular place has traditionally been an immigrant destination or has only recently become so; its political culture; its tradition of civic participation; how religious, racial, and ethnic diversity is managed, the labor market structures, and the nature of the built environment all shape the relationship between transnational engagements and the modes and pathways of immigrant incorporation (Glick Schiller 2006; Haller and Landolt 2005). In particular, migration researchers in Europe have noted the relationship between the size and significance of specific cities and their patterns of incorporation and settlement (Bommes and Radtke 1996; Rex 1009). Building on the work of Lefebvre (1991), they use the term "scale" to capture the differential positioning of cities within hierarchies of economic and cultural power (Brenner 2004; Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997). Such spatialized approaches to statehood reveal that, in this era of globalization, not only the relationship between localities, but also that between localities and states changes (Glick Schiller and Levitt 2006).

In sum, the second generation will not participate in their ancestral homes in the same way as their parents. Clearly, children who are physically raised in a receiving country are socialized primarily into that new context. But like Sonali and Bindi, who I described above, many young people frequently migrate between multiple cultural worlds. At school they are subject to American values, but at home and on the weekends, they live in ethnic, if not transnational, spaces that continue to be strongly shaped through religious and civic connections as well as social forces outside the

United States. Transnational activities may not be central to their lives nor do they necessarily devote their evenings, weekends, and vacations to homeland projects and political affairs as their parents did. But individuals raised in households permeated by values, behaviors, and contacts from afar have the ability and connections to become transnational actors *if and when* they chose to do so. Moreover, the institutions these young people often belong to locally are situated within thick, dense organizational networks that link them to people and places around the world.

When we operationalize transnational attachments solely as language fluency, homeland trips, or a desire to live in the homeland, we miss the many forms of social connections and capabilities that are possible without physical movement or complete bilingualism and biculturalism. It is no surprise, then, that ethnographic work, using a distinctive set of indicators, paints a different picture. It is not just actual transnational involvements that matter; it is also how transnational factors influence life experiences. Taking the concept of social field seriously, and defining transnational engagement more broadly, to include social, cultural, emotional and affective ties as well as economic and political engagements that ebb and flow over time, these authors find more second generation individuals involved in their ancestral homes and more young people whose lives are strongly shaped by homeland forces (Espiritu and Tran 2002; Kibria 2002; Leichtman 2005; Louie 2006a; 2006b; Purkayastha 2005; Smith 2006). Their work forces us to reconsider the conventional assumptions of assimilationists, and even some scholars of transnational migration about the level of transnationalism in the second generation, and to look at how a wider variety of factors influence their activities including geographic and cultural proximity to the home country, religion, class, and language fluency. Levels of transnational engagement will also vary in important ways throughout the life course (Espiritu 2003; Levitt 2007; Levitt and Waters 2002; Pries 2004).

Other children of immigrants, while not regular participants in transnational activities, incorporate homeland elements into their identities as they learn more about their family histories, a process some call emotional transnationalism. Doing so makes them rethink their place in the United States and in the world at large (Espiritu 2003; Kim 2006; Viruell-Fuentes 2006; Wolf 2002). For the second generation Chinese and Korean American college students that Kibria (2002) studied, for example, transnational engagements played only a small role in their lives. But they came to understand that Chinese and Korean membership could be strategically valuable --- helping them exploit the potential rewards of the global economy and overcome the racial barriers to mobility they might encounter in their professional futures (Fouron and Glick-Schiller 2002; Smith 2006). At the same time, they were deeply aware of the barriers they faced to their full acceptance in Chinese and Korean society.

Finally, the scope of transnational attachments across borders depends on the extent to which young people belong to civic, political, and religious organizations that are themselves transnational (Kurien 2005; Menjivar 2002; Mollenkopf, Holdaway and Kasinitz 2006). It also depends on the strength of the transnational family networks to which young people belong. I found (Levitt 2007) that many of the Gujarati Hindu young people I studied felt strong ties to India because they belonged to religious communities that were firmly rooted there. Religion also connected Pakistani Muslim young adults to fellow believers in places beyond the home country, because by participating in religious organizations they expressed their membership in the community of Muslims around the world (cf. Eade 1997 on Bangladeshi youth in London).

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION – UNDEREXPLORED AND UNDERUTILIZED**

Americans are a religious people. Only a minuscule fraction—roughly three percent—say they do not believe in God or a higher power of some kind (Newport 2006). Americans also

attend church more frequently than people of other highly-industrialized countries—nearly one-third go to religious services each week, and nearly two-thirds go at least once a month (according to Gallup polls for 2004-2006). About the same number believe that “religions can answer all or most of today’s problems” (ibid). These comparatively high rates of religiosity have deep roots. The United States was founded by immigrants seeking religious freedom. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution laid the groundwork for religious diversity to flourish. Reflecting this, Will Herberg (1955) wrote that immigrants to America were expected to abandon their nationality and language, but not their religion. In fact, Herberg persuasively argued that to be American was to be religious and that asserting a religious identity was an acceptable way to be both “different” and “American” at the same time.

Religious institutions have played a critical role in promoting the economic, social, and political integration of the first and, to a lesser extent, the second generation. Countless studies of turn-of-the-century immigration show how religion and ethnic congregations were key in helping immigrants adjust, adapt, and cope with life in a new society (see Hirschman 2004 for a review of these studies). Hirschman (2004) characterizes the role of religion in the American immigration experience as one in which the first generation arrives in the United States, settles among their co-ethnics, and revitalizes traditional practices and beliefs—most notably religion—to cope with the traumatic experience of immigration, to mobilize resources in a new environment, and to maintain a connection to the culture and society left behind. Religion, but more precisely the common-language and common-culture congregations in which immigrants chose to practice their religion, helped mediate immigrants’ relations with the mainstream society. Religious practice was expected of its newcomers. While ethnic differences clearly

contributed to inequality and discrimination, religious denominationalism, at least as defined by the Constitution, was egalitarian and positively promoted.

The contemporary religious scene has been described as a "marketplace" where Americans are encouraged to choose their faith based on the religious "product" yielding the most satisfaction (Finke and Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1994; Stark 1994). The choices available to American religious consumers have diversified greatly since Herberg's time because changes in U.S. Immigration laws in the mid-1960s radically transformed the immigrant pool. The Latin Americans and Asian immigrants and their children, who replaced the primarily European immigrants who preceded them are remaking the American religious landscape not only by Asian-izing and Latino-izing established Protestant and Catholic churches but also by practicing new—to American soil—religions such as Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism (Warner 2006). By doing so, they are changing what it means to be American and, in particular, a religious American.

**Religion as a Tool for Living across Borders**

How does religion affect mobility trajectories when we view them through a transnational optic that sees social location as multi-sited and shaped by factors at work in various settings? Many religious institutions were founded on universal claims and have always been worldwide in scope. In this current period of globalization, however, religion's universality and globalism often takes precedence over its national forms. Religion, like capitalism or politics, is no longer firmly rooted in a particular country or legal system.[7] This happens, in part, because religion is the ultimate boundary crosser. God needs no passport because faith traditions give their followers symbols, rituals, and stories they use to create alternative sacred landscapes, marked by holy sites, shrines, and places of worships.[8] For some people, these spaces are less important

than the actual political geography. Others belong to faith-based global movements that co-exist easily with their national and ethnic identities. Still others place more importance on the religious landscape than its secular counterpart. Minarets, crosses, and sanctuaries, rather than national monuments or historic structures, are the salient landmarks in their imaginary landscapes. What happens in Bombay, London, Johannesburg, Sydney, or Trinidad, for example, matters much more to some Swadhyaya members (one of the Hindu communities I studied) because these are the boundaries that create a sort of "Swadhyaya country." Religion also transcends the boundaries of time because it allows followers to feel part of a chain of memory, connected to a past, a present, and a future (Davie 2000; Hervieu-Léger 2000). That is why Cubans in Miami, for example, bring their newborns to be baptized at a shrine they built to their national patron saint. There, they induct their children into an imagined Cuban nation with a past in their ancestral land, a present in Miami, and a future they hope to re-claim again in Cuba (Tweed 1997). Religion, then, comes equipped with narratives, symbols, and resources that are uniquely suited to living across borders and are readily available to immigrants and their children.

Religion in the Unites States is omnipresent, a fact most Americans are unwilling to acknowledge. The separation of church and state is so firmly embedded in our psyche that many people in the United States treat religion and culture as more distinct than they actually are. But many newcomers arrive from places where religion and culture go hand in hand. They cannot sort out Irishness from Catholicism, Indianness from being Hindu, or what it means to be Pakistani from what it means to be a Muslim. Faith guides how they live their everyday lives, whom they associate with, and the kinds of communities they belong to, and this is true even among people who say they are not religious. Their ideas about tolerance and diversity are

shaped by experiences where states actively regulate religious life and where expectations about relations between "us" and "them" are quite different from those in the United States.

As a result, many immigrants bring a much broader understanding of what religion is and where to find it to the table. When people adorn their refrigerator doors with "saint magnets," hang cross-stitched samplers with religious teachings on their walls, light candles in honor of the Vírgen, or decorate their rearview mirrors and dashboards with photos of their gurujis, they imbue the quotidian with the sacred. The religious and the spiritual also spill over into the workplace, the schoolyard, the health clinic, and the law office. When a Latino family celebrates its daughter's fifteenth birthday or a Hindu son invites his elderly father to live with him in the United States, they are performing religious as well as "cultural" acts. For some newcomers, American values are, in part, religious values. And these values are not just made in the U.S.A. but around the world.

**The Potential Benefits of Religion**

Religion, therefore, plays a role in almost all aspects of the migration experience – the journey, the process of settlement, and the emergence of ethnic and transnational ties (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Hirschman 2004; Levitt 2007; McAlister 2002; Richman 2005). Moreover, religious belonging doesn't simply link migrants to co-religionists in the home and host-country; global religious movements also unite members, wherever they live, with fellow believers around the globe (Bowen 2004; Marquardt 2005).

Belonging to a religious community furnishes the children of immigrants with alternative identities and values that they use to position themselves vis a vis their peers. Vineeta, a twenty-three year old member of the Swadhyaya community, for example, explained that belonging to Swadhyaya allowed her "to stick to her guns," particularly while she was in college and felt

pressured by her peers to participate in behaviors she knew were wrong. It was a permanent, protective message inside her head that constantly reminded her to do the right thing. It also helped her remain strong when she felt treated like "a brown person." She felt she could remain faithful to her true sense of self and not pretend to be something or someone else that white people expected of her. When she felt marginalized in the United States, she imagined herself at home in a Hindu India. Kudret, an 18-year-old high school senior, felt that Islam gave her the courage to steer clear of the highly sexualized environment she confronted on a daily basis. She did not want to interact that way with her male peers nor did she want to be treated merely as a sex object. Her faith guided her toward another type of interaction, she said, and gave her the strength to follow it.

The children of immigrants also use religion to differentiate themselves from racial and ethnic groups they might otherwise be associated with and to reposition themselves in the social hierarchy of the host country. They embrace Hinduness, for example, to avoid being labeled a racial or ethnic minority (Kurien 2005). In the same way that Waters (1999) found children of West Indians who adopted accents and clothing styles to signal they were different from African Americans, some Muslim young women also wear headscarves, not only because they believe it is the right thing to do, but also because it differentiates them from Latinas. Some young people attend Evangelical youth group meetings each night, and inter-collegiate events each weekend, to limit their interactions with non-Christians.

Religion also serves as an arena from which to explore and assert connections to the homeland and beyond. Claiming Hinduness or Muslimness is also about claiming Indianness or Pakistaniness, both because religion and culture overlap, and because the homeland is the source from which faith comes. Becoming a follower of "televangelist" Farat Hashmi, a Pakistani-born

and Western-educated scholar now at the al-Huda Institute of Islamic Education for Women in Canada, is easy because of the many audio and videotapes, books, and resources available for purchase on the Internet. Young women become part of a worldwide community seeking to be more faithful to the true roots of the Islamic tradition and to actively engage with it. While the second generation is busy creating Hinduism and Evangelical Christianity Brazilian-style in America, they are also to varying degrees, interacting with and transforming its homeland iteration and its various interactions around the world.[9]

This is, in large part, due to the fact that these new religious expressions of the first and second generation create and are created by new religious architectures. My research revealed at least four types of architectural forms including transnational religious corporations, national religious groups operating across borders, flexibly specialized religious networks, and transnational supply chains (Levitt 2007). By offering young people systematic, collective arenas within which to practice their faith and by providing protected channels within which ideas and practices can circulate, these cross-border organizational structures strongly influence how the children of immigrants manage their multiple memberships. For one, many of these groups function like "franchises" or chapters of home-country organizations. Swamis and Pastors back in the homeland supervise and control their activities. Members retain their official status in home-country churches. They continue to tithe there. They contribute to special campaigns and projects. They host visiting religious leaders. And they are the subject of the prayers of those who remain behind. Each time young people participate in collective worship, they are asserting and exploring their homeland ties.

In addition, some communities, like the International Swaminarayan Satsang Organization (ISSO) and BAPS (Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan

Sanstha) organize their members into special-interest groups. Like homeland political parties, which often attract participants by creating special groups for youth, young adults, and women, individuals belong to religious communities by joining a local church or temple and by belonging to smaller age and gender-specific groups that have national and international networks of their own.[10] The Women's Wing of BAPS, for example, has chapters at each local temple that are also part of the National and International Women's Wing. The idea, according to one of its Directors, is to reinforce members' relationship to the organization in a variety of ways and to reach out to them at specific stages of their lives. The same person who belonged to the youth group as a teenager participates in the Women's Wing as a young mother.[11] The children of immigrants may not feel a particularly strong affinity to the religious community as a whole but may be tied to it, and to their homeland, by belonging to one of these auxiliary groups.

Many parents are deeply concerned about teaching their children homeland values. They want to maintain their culture and protect their children from the negative influences that surround them (Menjivar 2002; Parreñas 2001; 2005). Religious communities are perfect allies in these efforts. Faith communities want to ensure their longevity by involving the second generation. Muslim and Hindu communities alike now offer "Sunday school" classes like their Christian counterparts. Religious summer camps are the equivalent of Protestant Vacation Bible Schools. Many times this socialization, both informally and formally, takes place across borders. Take the example of Sureshbhai, a professor and Swadhyaya member who recruited a considerable number of new members from the student body at his university, many of whom later migrated to the United States. He stayed in touch with them, however, continuing to shepherd them through marriage, childrearing, and sometimes divorce. If he felt he couldn't do

an adequate job via long distance, he would contact another *motobhai* or elder brother living in the United States and ask him to stand in.

Several religious groups also create special homeland schools where children are sent for cultural immersion. Swadhyayees can enroll their children in a one-year post-high-school "cultural education" course in Bombay. BAPS brings twenty-plus high-school-aged girls to live at the Temple complex in Ahmedabad each summer. They also opened a high school for Non-Resident Indians. The idea for this came from a follower living in London who, as the story goes, visited BAPS leader Pramuk Swami and placed a bag of money at his feet. He was fed up, he said, with how his children were growing up in England. Because Swaminarayans are such a miniscule minority, it's impossible to maintain their culture, he explained. "The kids can answer multiple choice questions," he lamented, "but they can't write an essay about who they are." He donated money to build a school for girls that now has 350 students. Fifteen percent of the students are NRIs, and most come from the United States; but there are also students from the U.K., Dubai, and Africa. Indian residents pay about $1,150 annually; for NRI families, it's a bit higher - $1,800. Students don't have to be Swaminarayan to attend.

The children of immigrants learn more than culture and values by belonging to religious institutions. They also learn concrete skills they use in other parts of their everyday lives. Because many immigrant faith communities are not large or wealthy enough to maintain clergy of their own, there are more opportunities for lay leadership. Women, in particular, play more central roles, not only in worship, but also in running social and educational programs, since so many mosques and temples double as social and cultural centers. Their children grow up thinking this is how things are done.

Faith communities also come equipped with powerful resources and tools that encourage civic activism and shape its outcomes. They bring members into contact with fellow believers who don't necessarily come from the same country. Sometimes, they even seat them in the same pews alongside the native-born. Migrants and their children hear sermons and attend programs that influence how they think about changing the world and where they will do it. Their experiences in religious communities influence how they put these into practice. In some cases, as with the Irish and Brazilian Catholics in my study, religious membership also integrates migrants into influential, well-endowed institutions with a great deal of clout (Levitt 2007).

When people interact with each other, in their neighborhoods, at work, or when they drink coffee after worship, they create social capital. According to Robert Putnam, "Faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America" (Putnam 2000, 66). His research revealed that nearly half the associational memberships in American were church related, half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurred in religious contexts.[12] Indeed, religious membership was a potent social capital source for immigrants and their children. For one thing, participating in religious communities taught them political skills. Even when religious institutions don't have an explicit political agenda, people learn about fundraising, organizing, and leadership by participating in faith communities which they then apply to other settings.[13] Information is disseminated and opinions are formed. What happens at the church or mosque strongly influences how people distribute their time and money between home and host-country issues.

People belonging to communities where they interact regularly with native-born co-religionists also get a crash course in Civics. Inishoweners from Ireland, for example, attended

Mass in English alongside native-born parishioners led by native and foreign-born priests. Unlike non-English speakers, who often form their own ethnic parish councils, they participated directly in parish governance. They could rattle off a list of things they did at church, like signing petitions or attending a "Meet the Candidates Night," they had never done in Inishowen. Worshipping next to people from other countries was also an eye-opening experience. It hadn't occurred to most people to think about church as a place to find a job or an apartment. "In Ireland," according to Dan, a thirty-five year old return migrant in Buncrana, "we go to church for 45 minutes and that's it until next week. The Church and the state are so intertwined; the priests would never say anything against the government. Over in Boston, the priest used to say things and I didn't always agree. But you had to hand it to him for not being afraid to speak up."

In addition to providing services, some religious groups actively encourage political and civic participation among immigrants and their children. Its goals and forms depend a lot on particular organizational arrangements. The Irish Apostolate/USA, for example, has become something of an advocacy group, working for migrants in the U.S. and Ireland. In 2000, it joined with a coalition of Irish Immigration Centers across the country to promote immigrant rights. Its activities are partially supported by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and by the Irish Government. The priests working for the Apostolate see their job as helping people establish themselves in the U.S. and keeping them on the Irish public's radar screen.

Families from Governador Valadares receive religious political socialization that keeps them firmly tied to Brazil. Both Protestants and Catholics usually attended services led by a Brazilian-born leader, conducted in Portuguese. Many congregants still sent contributions to the churches they attended before migrating. They remained on the rolls as dues-paying or tithing

members. They contributed to projects and campaigns to help Brazilian causes. They discussed Brazilian politics over coffee following mass.

Finally, religiosity also drives philanthropy. While the first generation does most of the giving, the second generation is being trained that this is the “right thing” to do. A recent study commissioned by The Pakistani Centre for Philanthropy in Islamabad[14] revealed a community solidly rooted in the United States that gives generously to both American and homeland causes and increasingly demands to know how its money is being spent. The average household among the estimated 500,000 Pakistanis living in the United States contributed about $2,500 in money and goods, and approximately 435 hours of volunteer time each year, amounting to $250 million in cash and in-kind giving, and the equivalent of $750 million in volunteered time – a total of $1 billion annually. About forty percent ($100 million) went to Pakistani causes in Pakistan, another 40 percent went toward causes unrelated to Pakistan, and the remaining 20 percent went toward Pakistani causes in the United States. More than half of the volunteer hours, the equivalent of 13,500 full-time employees, went toward causes not related to Pakistan, such as soup kitchens, school associations and community groups. Most of the remainder went to Pakistani-related social, cultural, and philanthropic endeavors. Donors were equally motivated by faith and issues. In fact, faith inspired Pakistanis in much the same way it inspires Americans -- it’s the *reason* they give, rather than the destination.[15]

**Religion’s Potential Costs**

In addition to the opportunities and resources religious participation engenders, it also entails costs. Kin networks can be exploitative, a process of transnational class stratification whereby more prosperous family members make demands of people defined as kin. Kin networks maintained between people who send remittances and those who live on them are often

fraught with tension. Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (2002) use the term “relativizing” to refer to the ways in which individuals establish, maintain, or curtail ties to specific family members. Within transnational social fields people actively pursue or neglect blood ties and invent “fictive kin,” based on their particular needs, strategically choosing which connections to emphasize and which to let slide. Members of the second generation who inhabit these same fields are no exception. The resource and time allocation decisions made by their parents affect behavior in their own households. They also have to dedicate time and resources to maintaining relations that can thwart their personal projects. In fact, Richman (2005) found that many of the Haitians she studied converted to Christianity so they could extricate themselves from the web of connections and obligations imposed on them by Voodoo practice.

While there is some evidence that migrants introduce more moderate religious expressions to their homeland, there are also those who hold emigrants responsible for the rise of religious conservativism and fundamentalism (Hansen 1999; Rajagopal 1997) Some argue that religious values are deployed to maintain the gender status quo, although, not surprisingly, many of the female members of the same religious groups say they feel empowered and satisfied (Alumkal 1999; Caglar 1995; Espiritu 1992). To be sure, I often encountered what I call “the ossification effect,” whereby migrants held fast to the idea of a more conservative, traditional Brazil or India that no longer exists. Everyone is confused by the family member who was not very religious before migrating, who arrives with his children wanting to go directly from the airport to the temple or mosque while the rest of the family looks on in surprise (Levitt 2007). A parallel phenomenon characterizes the child who disapproves of what she sees as her parents’ religious laxity. Kibria (2005), for example, found sharp tensions between second generation

Bangladeshis and their parents in the U.K. who felt their mothers and fathers were practicing a watered-down folksy version of Islam which was unfaithful to its true roots.

This scales up to affect the society at large. Some people see religious groups such as the ISSO, BAPS and Swadhyaya as fueling a fundamentalist Neo-Hindu agenda. But for the second generation, politico-religious ideologies articulated in the homeland resonate differently in the receiving-country context. For example, while Hindutva signifies superiority, truth, and anti-Muslimness in India, Kamat and Mathew (2003) argue that U.S. Hindus adopt Hindutva within (and paradoxically because) because American multiculturalist discourse reifies “neglected” minorities, thereby encouraging a Hindu-Americanness of this kind. Because it is a relativist ideology, it tolerates a certain amount of fundamentalism (see also Kurien 2004). Dhooleka Raj (2000) describes a similar process for young Hindus in Great Britain, documenting how young people deploy their Hindu identity to differentiate themselves from Muslims or other “Asians.”

**Conclusion**

The second generation and beyond are the wave of the future in the United States. They will ultimately determine what it means to be Hindu, Buddhist, or Muslim in America and will also change the nation's contemporary Christian face. What’s more, their religious ties to their homelands emphasize that American religious life is no longer just “made in the USA,” if in fact, it ever was. Recent events in Europe have highlighted the potentially volatile mix of second generation status, non-Christian religious affiliations, and social and economic marginalization. The children of immigrants increasingly turn to “inherited religion” as their primary source of identity (Laurence 2006). Some youth hear their faith as a call to violence and see it as platform from which to protest their social marginalization. At the same time, youth from similar backgrounds, in the very same countries, use religion to make a place for themselves in their

home and host communities. The crucial question, then, is – what about the intersection between religion, immigration, and society makes religious beliefs and practices a pathway to political participation for some and as a political pathway of its own for others? One thing for sure is that the answer is not just a national one.

## REFERENCES CITED


Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration." *International Migration Review* 31:826-874.

—. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Alumkal, Antony W. 1999. "Preserving patriarchy: Assimilation, gender norms, and second-generation Korean American evangelicals." *Qualitative Sociology* 22:127-140.

Beyer, Peter. 2001. "Introduction." Pp. i-xliv in *Religion in the Process of Globalization*, edited by Peter Beyer. Wurzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag.

Bommes, Michael, and Frank-Olaf Radtke. 1996. "Migration into big cities and small towns: An uneven process with limited need for multiculturalism." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* 9:75-86.

Bowen, John. 2004. "Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30:879-894.

Brenner, Neil. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling Of Statehold*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Brubaker, Roger. 2003. "Ethnicity without groups." *European Journal of Sociology* 43:163-189.

Bryceson, Deborah Fahy, and Ulla Vuorela. 2002. *The transnational family : new European frontiers and global networks*. Oxford ; New York: Berg.

Burawoy, Michael. 2000. *Global ethnography : forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Caglar, Ayse. 1995. "German Turks in Berlin: Social exclusion and strategies for social mobility." *New Community* 21:309-323.

—. 2002. "The Discrete Charm of Dual Citizenship: Citizenship Ties, Trust and the 'Pink Card'." Pp. 248-262 in *Unraveling Ties - From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness*, edited by et al Elkana. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.

Casanova, José. 1994. *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 2001. "Religion, the new millennium, and globalization." *Sociology of Religion* 62:415-41.

Daniel, G. Reginald. 2006. *Race and multiraciality in Brazil and the United States : converging paths?* University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Davie, Grace. 2000. *Religion in modern Europe : a memory mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Demerath, N. J. 2001. *Crossing the gods : world religions and worldly politics*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
DeSipio, L. 2002. "Immigrant organizing, civic outcomes: Civic engagement, political activity, national attachment, and identity in Latino immigrant communities." *Center for the Study of Democracy, paper*:02–08.
Eade, J. 1997. "Identity, nation and religion: Educated young Bangladeshis in London's East End." *Living the global city: Globalization as local process*:146-162.
Ebaugh, Helen Rose, and Paula Pipes. 2001. "Immigrant Congregations As Social Service Providers: Are They Safety Nets for Welfare Reform?" Pp. 95-110 in *Religion and Social Policy for the 21st Century*, edited by Paula Nesbitt. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.
Eckstein, S. 2004. "On Deconstructing Immigrant Generations: Cohorts and the Cuban Émigré Experience." Working Paper, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California San Diego. http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/working_papers.htm.
Eckstein, Susan, and Lorena Barberia. 2002. "Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban Americans and Their Transnational Ties." *International Migration Review* 36:799-837.
Espiritu, Yen Le. 1992. *Asian American panethnicity : bridging institutions and identities*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
—. 2003. *Home bound : Filipino lives across cultures, communities, and countries*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Espiritu, Yen Le, and Thom Tran. 2002. "Viêt Nam, Nu'óc Tôi (Vietnam, My Country): Vietnamese Americans and transnationalism." Pp. 367-398 in *The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation*, edited by Peggy Levitt and Mary C. Waters. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Fernandes, Florestan. 1969. *The Negro in Brazilian society*. New York,: Columbia University Press.
Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 1992. *The churching of America, 1776-1990 : winners and losers in our religious economy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Fouron, G., and N. Glick-Schiller. 2002. "The generation of identity: redefining the second generation within a transnational social field." *The changing face of home: the transnational lives of the second generation*:168–208.
Fox, Richard Gabriel, and Orin Starn. 1997. *Between resistance and revolution : cultural politics and social protest*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
Gallup Organization, The. various. " KEYWORD=Religion, 1976-2006." in *"The Gallup Brain" Database at http://www.galluppoll.com/*.
Gardner, Katy, and Ralph Grillo. 2002. "Transnational households and ritual: an overview." *Global networks* 2:179-190.
Glick Schiller, Nina. 2006. "What Does Transnational Studies Offer to the Study Of Localized Conflict and Protest?" *Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology* 47:1-10.
Glick Schiller, Nina, Ayse Caglar, and Thaddeus C. Guldbrandsen. 2006. "Beyond the Ethnic Lens: Locality, Globality, and Born-Again Incorporation." *American Ethnologist* 33:612-633.
Glick Schiller, Nina, and Peggy Levitt. 2006. "Haven't We Heard this Somewhere Before? A Substantive Review of Transnational Migration Studies by Way of a Reply to Waldinger and Fitzgerald." in *The Center for Migration and Development Working Paper*.

Hagan, Jacqueline, and Helen Rose Ebaugh. 2003. "Calling Upon the Sacred: Migrants' Use Of Religion in the Migration Process." *International Migration Review* 37:1145-1162.

Haller, William, and Patricia Landolt. 2005. "The transnational dimensions of identity formation: Adult children of immigrants in Miami." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28:1182-1214.

Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. *The saffron wave : democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Herberg, Will. 1955. *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company.

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2000. *Religion as a chain of memory*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Hirschman, Charles. 2004. "The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States." *International Migration Review* 38:1206-33.

Htun, M. 2004. "From" racial democracy" to affirmative action: changing state policy on race in Brazil." *Latin American Research Review* 39:60-89.

Iannaccone, L. R. 1994. "Why Strict Churches Are Strong." *The American Journal of Sociology* 99:1180-1211.

Jacoby, Tamar. 2004. "Defining Assimilation for the 21st Century." Pp. 1-16 in *Reinventing the melting pot : the new immigrants and what it means to be American* edited by Tamar Jacoby. New York: Basic Books.

Jones-Correa, M. A., and D. L. Leal. 2001. "Political Participation: Does Religion Matter?" *Political Research Quarterly* 54:751-770.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the mind of God : the global rise of religious violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kamat, S, and B Mathew. 2003. "Mapping political violence in a globalized world: The case of Hindu nationalism." *Social Justice* 30:4-17.

Kasinitz, P., J. H. Mollenkopf, and M. C. Waters. 2004. *Becoming New Yorkers: ethnographies of the new second generation*: Russell Sage.

Khagram, S., and P. Levitt. 2004. *Towards a Field of Transnational Studies and a Sociological Transnationalism Research Program*: Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Harvard University.

Kibria, Nazli. 2002. *Becoming Asian American : second-generation Chinese and Korean American identities*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

—. 2005. "South Asian Americans." Pp. 206-227 in *Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues*, edited by Pyong Gap Min. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Kim, Nadia. 2006. "Patriarchy is so 'Third World': Korean Immigrant Women and 'Migrating' White Western Masculinity." *Social Problems* 53:forthcoming.

Kivisto, Peter. 2005. *Incorporating diversity : rethinking assimilation in a multicultural age*. Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers.

Kurien, Prema A. 2004. "Multiculturalism, Immigrant Religion, and Diasporic Nationalism: The Development of an American Hinduism." *Social Problems* 51:362-385.

Kurien, Prema A. 2005. "Being Young, Brown, and Hindu: The Identity Struggles of Second-Generation Indian Americans." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 34:434-469.

Laurence, Jonathan. 2006. "Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe." Pp. 251-273 in *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, edited by Craig Parsons and Timothy Smeeding. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, J., H. P. Pachon, and M. Barreto. 2002. "Guiding the flock: church as vehicle of Latino political participation." Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. *The production of space*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Leichtman, Mara A. 2005. "The legacy of transnational lives: Beyond the first generation of Lebanese in Senegal." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28:663-686.
Levitt, Peggy. 1998. "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion." *International Migration Review* 32:926-948.
—. 2007. *God Needs No Passport: How Immigrants are Changing the American Religious Landscape*. New York: The New Press.
—. forthcoming. "I Feel I Am a Citizen of the World and of a Church Without Borders: The Latino Religious Experience." in *Becoming Latinos, Latinos Becoming*, edited by Rodolfo de la Garza, Louis DeSipio, and Harry Pachon. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* 38:1002-1039.
Levitt, Peggy, and Mary C. Waters. 2002. *The changing face of home : the transnational lives of the second generation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Louie, Vivian. 2006a. "Growing up ethnic in transnational worlds: Identities among second-generation Chinese and Dominicans." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 13:363-394.
—. 2006b. "Second-Generation Pessimism and Optimism: How Chinese and Dominicans Understand Education and Mobility Through Ethnic and Transnational Orientations." *International Migration Review* 40:537.
Mahler, S. J., and P. R. Pessar. 2006. "Gender matters: Ethnographers bring gender from the periphery toward the core of migration studies." *International Migration Review* 40:27-63.
Mannheim, Karl. 1951. "Das Problem der Generationen. Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie." Pp. 309-330 in *Essays on Sociology of Knowledge*, edited by Paul Kecskemeti. New York: Oxford University Press.
Marquardt, Marie Friedmann. 2005. "From Shame to Confidence: Gender, Religious Conversion, and Civic Engagement of Mexicans in the U.S. South." *Latin American Perspectives* 32:27-56.
McAlister, Elizabeth A. 2002. *Rara! : vodou, power, and performance in Haiti and its diaspora*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Menjivar, C. 2002. "Living in Two Worlds? Guatemalan-Origin Children in the United States and Emerging Transnationalism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28:531-553.
Mollenkopf, John H, Jennifer Holdaway, and Philip Kasinitz. 2006. "Politics among young adults in New York : the immigrant second generation." Pp. 175-193 in *Transforming politics, transforming America : the political and civic incorporation of immigrants in the United States*, edited by Taeku Lee, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, and Ricardo Ramírez. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Morawska, E. 2003. "Immigrant transnationalism and assimilation: a variety of combinations and the analytic strategy it suggests." *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*:133–176.
Najam, Adil. 2006. "Portrait of a Giving Community: Philanthropy as a Tool for Managing Diaspora Identity." in *Conference on Diaspora Philanthropy and Global Equity*. Harvard University.

Newport, Frank. 2006. "Who Believes in God and Who Doesn't?: Belief in God correlated with socioeconomic status." Princeton, NJ: Gallup News Service. Accessed from: http://www.galluppoll.com/.

Nobles, Melissa, and Melissa Nobles. 2000. "History Counts: A Comparative Analysis of Racial/Color Categorization in US and Brazilian Censuses." *American Journal of Public Health* 90:1738.

Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar. 2001. *Servants of globalization : women, migration and domestic work*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

—. 2005. *Children of global migration : transnational families and gendered woes*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Perlmann, J., and Roger Waldinger. 1997. "Second generation decline? Children of immigrants, past and present, a reconsideration." *International Migration Review* 31:893.

Pluss, Caroline. 2005. "Constructing Globalized Ethnicity: Migrants from India in Hong Kong." *International Sociology* 20:201-224.

Portes, Alejandro, Patricia Fernández-Kelly, and William Haller. 2005. "Segmented assimilation on the ground: The new second generation in early adulthood." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28:1000-1040.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies : the story of the immigrant second generation*. Berkeley and New York: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. "The New Second Generation Segmented Assimilation and its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth." *Annals* 530:74-96.

Prebish, Charles S., and Martin Baumann (Eds.). 2002. *Westward dharma : Buddhism beyond Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Pries, Ludger. 2004. "Determining the Causes and Durability of Transnational Labour Migration between Mexico and the United States: Some Empirical Findings." *International Migration* 42:3-39.

Purkayastha, Bandana. 2005. *Negotiating ethnicity : second-generation South Asian Americans traverse a transnational world*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Queen, Christopher. 2002. "Engaged Buddhism: Agnosticism, Interdependence, Globalization." Pp. 324-347 in *Westward Dharma: Buddhism beyond Asia*, edited by Charles S. Prebish and Martin Baumann. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Raj, D. S. 2000. ""Who the hell do you think you are?"" *Promoting religious identity among young Hindus in Britain', Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23:535-58.

Rajagopal, Arvind. 1997. "Transnational networks and Hindu nationalism." *Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars, vol* 29:45-58.

Reitz, Jeffrey G., and Kara Somerville. 2004. "Institutional Change and Emerging Cohorts of the 'New' Immigrant Second Generation: Implications for the Integration of Racial Minorities in Canada." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 5.

Rex, John. . 1009. "Multiculturalism and political integration in European cities: Special issue." *Innovations* 9.

Richman, K. E. 2005. *Migration and vodou*: University Press of Florida.

Rieffer, Barbara-Ann J.  2003. “Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship.” Ethnicities 3(2): 215-242. 2003. "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship." *Ethnicities* 3:215-242.

Robertson, R., and J. Chirico. 1985. "Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration." *Sociological Analysis* 46:219-242.

Robertson, Roland. 2001. "The Globalization Paradigm: Thinking Globally." in *Religion in the Process of Globalization*, edited by Peter Beyer. Wurzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag.

Rumbaut, Rubén G., and Alejandro Portes. 2001. *Ethnicities : children of immigrants in America*. Berkeley and New York: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Sherman, Amy L. 2003. "The community serving activities of Hispanic Protestant congregations ". Notre Dame University: Copublished by Hudson Institute’s Faith in Communities Initiative and The Center for the Study of Latino Religion

Smidt, Corwin E. 2003. "Religion, social capital, and democratic life: Concluding thoughts." Pp. 211-222 in *Religion as social capital : producing the common good*, edited by Corwin E. Smidt. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Smith, Neil. 1993. "Remaking Scale: Competition and Cooperation in Pre-national and Post-National Europe." in *In Competitive European Peripheries*, edited by Heikki Eskelinen and Folke Snickars. Berlin: Springer Verlag.

Smith, Robert C. 2006. *Mexican New York : transnational lives of new immigrants*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Spohn, Willfried. 2003. "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective." *Current Sociology* 51:265-86.

Stark, R. 1994. "Rational Choice Theories of Religion.'" *Agora* 2:1±5.

Suárez-Orozco, Carola, and Marcelo M Suárez-Orozco. 2001. *Children of immigrants*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.

Swyngedouw, E. 1997. "Neither global nor local: ‘glocalization’ and the politics of scale." *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*:137–166.

Totoricaguena, Gloria P. 2005. *Basque diaspora : migration and transnational identity*. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada.

Tweed, T. 2002. "Who Is a Buddhist? Night-Stand Buddhists and Other Creatures." *Westward Dharma: Buddhism beyond Asia, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA*.

Tweed, Thomas. 1997. *Our Lady of the Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Cuban Catholic Shrine in Miami*. New York: Oxford University Press.

U.S. Census Bureau. "Decennial Census 2000, PUMS Data. Summary Files 3 & 4. Available online through American Fact Finder at: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_ds_name=DEC_2000_SF4_U&_program=DEC&_lang=en."

Vásquez, Manuel A., and Marie F. Marquardt. 2003. *Globalizing the sacred : religion across the Americas*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Vásquez, Manuel A., and Philip J. Williams. 2005. "Introduction: The Power of Religious Identities in the Americas." *Latin American Perspectives* 32:5-26.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and equality : civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Viruell-Fuentes, E. A. 2006. ""My heart is always there": The transnational practices of first-generation Mexican immigrant and second-generation Mexican American women." *Identities-Global Studies in Culture and Power* 13:335-362.

Waldinger, R., and C. Feliciano. 2004. "Will the new second generation experience 'downward assimilation'? Segmented assimilation re-assessed." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27:376-402.

Warner, R. Stephen. 2006. "The De-Europeanization of American Christianity." in *A Nation of Religions: Pluralism in the American Public Square*, edited by Stephen Prothero. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. .

Waters, M. C., and T. R. Jimenez. 2005. "Assessing immigrant assimilation: New empirical and theoretical challenges." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31:105-125.

Waters, Mary C. 1999. *Black identities : West Indian immigrant dreams and American realities*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Werbner, P. 2000. "Global pathways. Working class cosmopolitans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds." *Social Anthropology* 7:17-35.

Willis, K. D. 2000. "Gender and Transnational Household Strategies: Singaporean Migration to China." *Regional Studies* 34:253-264.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *International Migration Review* 37:576-610.

Winant, Howard. 1994. *Racial conditions : politics, theory, comparisons*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wolf, D. 2002. "There's no place like 'home': emotional transnationalism and the struggles of second-generation Filipinos." *The changing face of home: the transnational lives of the second generation*:255–294.

Xie, Y., and E. Greenman. 2005. "Segmented Assimilation Theory: A Reformulation and Empirical Test." Population Studies Center Research Report No. 05-581, Univeristy of Michigan.

Yancey, George A. 2003. *Who is white?: Latinos, Asians, and the new Black/nonblack divide*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.

---

[1] Gujarat is one of the larger states in India.

[2] Combination of spices used in many Indian dishes.

[3] One notable exception is Haller and Landolt (2005) who use the third wave of CILS (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study) to explore the relationship between segemented assimilation, nationality, and the identities and practices associated with transnationalism. They find that selective acculturation is associated with greater transnational involvement and some evidence that downward assimilation is associated with higher rates of sending remittances among some nationalities. These findings are not contradictory, they argue, but rather indicative of a differences in transnational activism by class, ethnicity, and nationality.

[4] For critical re-assessments of segmented assimilation, see (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004; Xie and Greenman 2005)

[5] For an overview on the differences in racial constructions throughout the Americas, see among others, (Daniel 2006; Fernandes 1969; Htun 2004; Nobles and Nobles 2000; Waters 1999; Winant 1994; Yancey 2003).

[6] Glick Schiller and her colleagues expand the concept of incorporation through a transnational perspective and define it as "the processes of building or maintaining networks of social relations through which an individual or organized group of individuals becomes linked to an institution recognized by one or more states" (2006, 614).

[7] See, for example, Juergensmeyer (2003), Casanova (1994; 2001), Held, et al. (1999), Vásquez and Marquardt (2003). This book builds on this important literature by arguing for a move beyond a cross-cultural or comparative lens where the unit of analysis is generally the national society or a "world" religion. Demerath (2001), for example, compares the relationship between religion and politics in a variety of countries, but doesn't look at how those relationships interact with each other. Others report on different manifestations of the same religion around the globe but not the connections between them.

Since the worldwide and often parallel "resurgence" of religion and nationalism in the 1980s (the Islamic revolution in Iran, religious and counter-nationalist movements in the former Soviet bloc, etc.), there was been a revival of interest in religion and nationalism. Much of this work is based on an implicit surprise --- "modern" nationalism should have been secular, thus presenting a theoretical dilemma for mainstream social sciences married to a modernization paradigm (Spohn 2003, 265-66). For example, a recent article seeking to "address the absence of religion in the literature on nationalism" discusses two of the countries in this study, India and Ireland, without mentioning the relationship of their diasporas to the national conflicts (Rieffer 2003). This book makes the case for the importance of taking emigrants' transnational political activities into account.

A growing body of work has begun to use a broader optic and generates important insights into the role of religion in today's global world and how it differs from prior experiences. These theorists emphasize the need to use the global system as the primary unit of analysis to understand contemporary social life (Beyer 2001; cf. Queen 2002; Robertson 2001).

What are the cultural and religious consequences of "thick" contemporary globalization, with its increasing velocity? First, many religions have become *multi-centered*, which differs from their *multi-sitedness* of the past (Beyer 2001). Buddhist ideas and practices, for example, now move with unprecedented speed to non-Asian countries, but it's not simply a move from the religion's center to periphery – it's about the emergence of multiple new centers, with regionalized Buddhist interpretations and practices, that are socioculturally particularized (Prebish and Baumann 2002, 7). Because the centers are constantly in communication with each other, East and West and old and new infuse and transform one another. "These changes in the Buddhist worldview, from mutual encounters between Asia and the West, represent an example of a "profound mutual assimilation," displaying "hybridity all the way down" (Queen 2002, 331).

Second, if globalization is the ever-changing state of "mutability" (Beyer 2001) and we no longer have the security of an ascribed or fixed sense of self (Robertson and Chirico 1985), then several problems arise to which religion poses solutions. Robertson and Chirico (1985) define two of them – the "legitimacy of the world order of societies (nations)" and "the meaning of what mankind 'really is'." These are essentially problems of definition, both at the universal level (what is happening to my society/nation in this globalizing world?) as well as at the level of the self (who am I as a member of this society/nation and as a member of humanity at large?). These concerns engender a paradoxical response - we search not only for particularistic identities (the local) but also for the meaning of the universal whole (the global): thus, globalization is about universalization of particularisms and the particularization of universalisms (Beyer 2001; Casanova 2001; Robertson 2001).

These largely theoretical accounts tell us little about how religion is actually lived. Further, as Spohn (2003) asserts, globalization theories are macro-paradigms that are not unlike modernization paradigms in some respects. One essentializes the global system, the other the nation-state system. Both tend to "correlate the political, socioeconomic and cultural phenomena and dimensions, instead of considering the local, national and transnational macro-micro linkages, relations and interactions" (Spohn 2003, 266). Vásquez and Marquardt (2003, 3) warn similarly, "There is a danger of "glossing over the contested, uneven, and situated impact of globalization. Abstract readings of globalization risk obscuring the conflict-laden relations among global, regional, national, local and individual actors and processes. That is why we prefer to talk about "anchored" or "grounded" globalization" (Burawoy 2000; Fox and Starn 1997). They use case studies, as I do, to emphasize the importance of local places and thick descriptions.

[8] According to Vásquez and Marquardt (2003, 35), religion "is one of the main protagonists in [the process] of unbinding culture from its traditional referents and boundaries and in its reattachment in new space-time configurations." Individuals use religion to create new spatio-temporal arrangements and invent new mental maps with which to locate themselves within terrains that globalization is constantly changing. See also (Tweed 2002).

[9] While the focus is often on factors that affect the second-generation, there is always a reciprocal effect of intergenerational relations not only on homeland connections, but also first-generation parents, relatives, and extended kinship relations (Reitz and Somerville 2004).

[10] Swadhyaya also has the *Bal Sanskar Kendra* for young children, the *Yuva Kendra* and the Divine Brain Trust for older children and young adults, and the *Mehila Kendra* for women.

[11] Transnational political parties employ a similar strategy. Young people participate first in youth groups and then in groups for young adults. Ultimately, they graduate into groups of male and female supporters, often after a political education similar to the ISSO's nine exam levels.

[12] These differences have prompted some scholars to coin the term, "spiritual capital,' which they are working to distinguish from its "social" counterpart. Corwin Smidt summarizes why the social capital you get from religion is unique along four dimensions. It is more <u>durable</u>, because religious standards evaluate success differently. It may also be stronger and broader in its <u>range</u>

and scope of influence. Religious social relationships may be less instrumental, not following the logic of self-interest but based on the calling to help others for helping's sake and to give voice to those who cannot advocate for themselves. Its rewards may be transcendent rather than material, rooted in such religious beliefs as getting to heaven through good works on earth. Finally, the religious institutional realm is one where opportunities are distributed in a relatively democratic fashion. Regardless of their socio-economic status or education attainment, active members learn leadership, administrative and other skills important for civic engagement and political participation. Smidt concludes, echoing Putnam, that "religion rivals education as the most important variable related to most forms of civic engagement." See Smidt (2003, 216-218) and Putnam (2000, 67). On the potential for religious social capital to operate beyond the boundaries of the church, see also Warren, Wood, and Nemeth and Luiden's chapters in Corwin Smidt's 2003 edited volume on religion as social capital.

[13] There are major debates about how this actually works. For example, attaining civic skills may not always translate into civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). See also (DeSipio 2002; Ebaugh and Pipes 2001; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Lee, Pachon and Barreto 2002; Sherman 2003).

[14] The latest findings (Najam 2006) are summarized in a report drafted for a workshop of diaspora philanthropy and equitable development held by the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University in May of 2006.

[15] Based on giving patterns in the United States, which indicate that Americans who contribute to fulfill religious obligations give about twice as much as other households, Najam finds the Pakistani "half and half" giving comparable (see for example, Toppe et al's 2001 report, "Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001"). The issues that Pakistanis in America consider most important are split almost equally between poverty and helping the needy (29% each), civil and human rights (25%), religion (25%), and education/literacy (20%). There is a profound distrust of formalized organizations, regardless of whether they are NGOs, educational or religious institutions. Thus, many funds go directly to family and friends or to needy individuals, identified by kinship networks that "research" appropriate, accountable and trustworthy causes. In fact, the vast majority of respondents felt that giving would increase significantly if people could be reassured they were giving to honest causes. The single most important consideration, not surprisingly given the post-9/11 climate in the United States, was "more clarity on U.S. laws about giving to organizations in Pakistan," followed by the desire for easier transfer mechanisms, communication, accountability and legitimacy of receiving organizations (Najam 2006).